Laïcité, a "Neutralizing Neutrality"? The French State and "Cults"

This talk, published by the CICNS (Centre d’Information et de Conseil des Nouvelles Spiritualités) on its YouTube channel, addresses the French state’s treatment of what it calls “cults” and the meaning of laïcité’s “neutrality”. The speaker is not named on-air. Speaking with the vocabulary of the sociology of religion, he argues that if “cults” were truly the social scourge they are said to be, France would have created a dedicated judge for them, as it did for children; that the French system in fact intervenes in religion more heavily than the United Kingdom or Germany; and that the 1905 law is a compromise woven of contradictory rules. His conclusion gives the talk its title. Neutrality, on his account, is not a way of abstaining but a way of acting, and of acting all the more, without having to withstand discussion.

CICNS talk. (English translation of a talk published on the CICNS YouTube channel on 29 October 2011. The speaker is not named on-air. The French transcript was machine-transcribed from the video and cleaned before translation; passages the machine could not reliably hear are marked [inaudible].)

[Speaker]: If cults constitute a genuine social scourge — if it really is a social scourge — then let us start from the hypothesis that it is one. I have a solution for regulating this problem, because there is a solution. In France, we sometimes consider that there are problems that are fundamental, and so we react accordingly, because those problems really are fundamental.

For example, we consider that children constitute a part of the population that must be especially protected. Since it must be especially protected, this part of the population, well, we have instituted a children’s judge. That is to say, people who are trained, who are better trained on this specific problem, because it was deemed to be truly a specific problem; as a result, they are better informed culturally, sociologically — not only from the point of view of the law — about what this social issue represents, so as to be able to act correctly.

What I propose is exactly that: if this really were an important social problem, well, we need a judge for cults. Because if there is a judge for cults, it means we will no longer operate on the basis of parliamentary reports that are drawn up in a manner that is, I mean, not even inquisitorial — since there is not even an inquiry in the sense of the word “inquisite” — but, of course, not at all adversarial; because we will fall within the framework of judicial procedure, which does after all carry a certain number of protections — that is, the proceedings will have to be adversarial, and we will have a judge trained with full knowledge of the subject within the École nationale de la magistrature itself. So do not come telling me that I hold extreme positions, since that, I find, would be the most rational position.

Why is this never proposed? Because, in their heart of hearts, I wonder whether the deputies really consider this an important social problem. I wonder whether they do not, in the end, consider it merely a political lever.

If there are plumbers who happen to have raped their clients at certain moments — which is certainly possible: statistically, it must have happened in the history of plumbing — would it be necessary, in order to try to defend plumbers, to show who the truly bad plumbers are? I do not believe that makes sense. I believe the essential thing is to say that it is legitimate to be a plumber and that there can be deviances among plumbers, just as there are deviances among religious people, and that it is legitimate to be religious, to believe a certain number of things.

To tell the truth, I do not think it works to say: “Here is the real… This one, this is a real cult, you see. There are some that are not real ones.” Because a “real cult” does not mean very much: because within a movement itself, there are people who are not responsible for what the leaders may do, or for what this or that person may do. It is too complex to unify… even about one particular movement, by saying: “Ah, that is a bad movement.” It is too complicated, it seems to me.

The fact that the French system intervenes in religion — intervenes very strongly in religion — is not, as I am often told, an imperfection of the system. That is to say: yes, religion cannot be sidestepped, it is after all socially important, so we are obliged to intervene a little; in France, even though we are laïque, we intervene a little. No. I want to tell you that in France, we intervene more than elsewhere. That is to say, the system’s mode of operation is to intervene more than elsewhere in the religious domain: more than in the United Kingdom, more than in Germany — countries that are not supposed, at least officially, to be laïque.

So we must face the obvious, if we have a minimum of sociological seriousness — I mean, a minimum — and give a description of the system by saying: there is laïcité, the principles, whatever you like — I am willing to discuss it, I find it very interesting, Rousseau, and so on. But at a given moment, when I describe laïcité — what we call laïcité — as to how it functions, I realize that there are cultuelle (worship) associations, there are congregations, there are laws that explain to us that such-and-such a sign is religious and such-and-such another is not. Yet a fellow who comes into a schoolyard with an enormous taiji — which is an ostensibly Taoist sign — will be told nothing. Why? Because it is also the sign of nice bourgeois surfers. You see? You see what I mean? And yet it is objectively religious.

That is to say, France is, after all, the country that permits itself to be permanently defining the religious — and a definition of the religious is necessarily itself religious, because it touches on transcendence — in the name of laïcité, it must be said, whereas elsewhere no one would permit themselves to say that. When, in the United Kingdom, you become a “charities” — the equivalent of public-interest status — it is because an attempt is made to see whether this association, this group, religious or not, more or less serves the general interest — whether that is true or false, whether there are religious lobbies or not. In any case, no one tries to say that it is because it is religious. In France, yes — directly. It is worth knowing, all the same.

In France, there are diocesan associations. It is not some… We are told: “The law of 1905 is wonderful.” Because — I remember, precisely, on Riposte, on that programme, with the former Minister of Culture, who had come to talk about worship (le culte), even though he is the Minister of Culture — but never mind, perhaps that is part of it… He tells us that the law of 1905 will have to be changed, because that way subsidies can be granted to repair mosques, and so on. Excuse me, Minister, but perhaps you should read the law, after all. Because it is provided for in the law. There have been amendments to the law, so it is provided for.

That is to say, the law of 1905 is a web… And that is fine — it is a law of compromise. It is a compromise. So, a web of rules that contradict one another across its various clauses. The law of 1905 bears the title “Separation of the Churches and the State”. That is, after all, the only place where it appears in the law, “separation of the Churches and the State”. And the title, under the Third Republic, was not legally enforceable. That says a great deal, all the same, about the legislator’s intentions: to put up a superb title, and then, inside, to say this, that, and so forth.

So, neutrality — what is it? Neutrality is this. Neutrality is the fact of saying: I am nowhere, therefore I am everywhere. Because that does not exist — obviously it does not exist. It means: I have no opinion. Is it possible not to have an opinion? Of course we do have an opinion. So it means: my opinion is not an opinion. Therefore it is indisputable, since it is not an opinion. It is the truth. That is what neutrality means.

Neutrality is therefore not a way of abstaining — which is what genuine separation ought to be — but a way of acting, and of acting even more, without having to withstand discussion. Whereas what is democracy, including in Habermas’s sense? It is precisely withstanding discussion of our actions. Thank you.